IRIS Quarterly Policy Report: Spring 2000 by -
The changes that have taken place on
the Balkans following the end of the
Kosovo crisis and the security
vacuum that has resulted from it
have required a new type of
relationships and interstate behavior
as well as a new regional security
system, which could provide for
stabilization of the security situation
in the region.
The implication of the principle of
self-determination in international
relations goes beyond the Balkan
situation. It is not only a legal or
human rights issueits security
aspects are likely to launch the
domino effect all over again,
affecting the whole region.
Organized crime and corruption,
involving broad sections of the
population support the growing wave of
criminalization. The viability of this
process is caused not so much by
assumptions for state or official support
and sponsoring but it is rather a result
of social and cultural phenomena.
Recently a process of great concern is
the affiliation of organized crime with
political structurestypical for the
entire area of the Balkans.
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One year after the Kosovo war the future of the Balkans seems more
opaque and uncertain than it was a year ago. The war could not succeed
in replacing successfully diplomacy and failed to fulfill its main purposes,
both in breaking off ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and in bringing lasting
peace and stability on the Balkans.
The international community could not effectively fill the political,
security, administrative and economic vacuum in Kosovo after the end
of the hot phase of the crisis. Even more, the two main factors in the
conflict  the Yugoslav military and police forces and the Albanian
extremist structures  pointed out by the West as the major sources
of instability, were not significantly weakened. Neither NATO attacks,
BALKAN SECURITY SYSTEM:
ONE YEAR AFTER
THE KOSOVO WAR
Is cordon sanitaire the most appropriate security
system model for the Balkan region?
Antonina Arbova
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nor the international blockade imposed on Yugoslavia, nor the consequent
damages were enough to shaken the power of the Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic.
On the contrary, while the political opposition in Serbia has proved
its inefficiency, he retains strong control on the security forces, military
commands, and an effective media machine. At the same time, NATOs
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo is losing control and the international
administration is failing to effectively administer the province. During
the last one year, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not disbanded, nor
it was demilitarized. De facto, KLA maintained strong hold on power
and undertook a revenge campaign of violation and ethnic cleansing in
full view of the international forces. As a result, the idea of multiethnic
Kosovo as well as the prospects of people of different ethnicity and
religion living together seem more unrealistic than a year ago.
The changes that have taken place on the Balkans following the
end of the Kosovo crisis and the security vacuum that has resulted from
it have required a new type of relationships and interstate behavior as
well as a new regional security system, which could provide for
stabilization of the security situation in the region. Disrespecting the
strong interdependence at the regional level and underestimating the
correlation between internal conflicts and their regional dimension, the
West has applied a rather isolationist approach. In contradiction to the
idea of their initially proclaimed purposes, the Western countries have
established a cordon sanitaire around Serbia. Thus, they have made
pointless any idea for multilateral confidence and stability-building
measures at the regional level leaving aside the state, which lies at the
heart of the Balkans and where there is a major risk of destabilization.
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Discrepancy between Purpose and Effects
The Purpose
A year ago NATO countries began a military campaign against the
regime in Belgrade coalescing politically around a set of purposes. The
primary purpose, which was pointed out, was the defense of the human
rights principle  stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians,
resolving the existing humanitarian problem and enabling refugees to
go home. But there was also a maximal purpose, based on the security
through integration and cooperation formula, which includes as
follows:
n Strengthening the process of regional cooperation and integration
as a significant contributing factor to stability and security in Europe
 development of an institutional system of regional cooperation in the
fields of economy, reconstruction, security, education and media, civil
society and democratization.
n Integrating the whole of Southeastern Europe into the structures
of the European Union.
n Establishing regional security structures which will be further
integrated into the common European security architecture.
Intensification of the regional military-political cooperation,
development of mutual initiatives for increasing trust and commitment
to solving problems of common concern, creation of regional sources
of security and transformation of the Balkan countries from objects into
subjects of their own security were seen by the international community
as the key principles of the organization of a new security system for
Southeastern Europe which would bring peace and stability to the entire
region.
10
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Spring 2000
The Effects
Institutional Effects
De jure Yugoslavia has a relatively well developed institutional system
endorsed by its constitution. During the last ten years, however, the
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has imposed a de facto authoritarian
regime dominated by nationalistic values. He has succeeded in transforming
nationalism into a tool for inner-state consolidation and into one of the
ways to improve own positions in the process of resolving the problems
with neighboring countries1.
There was a strong believe that the NATO military operation
against Yugoslavia could seriously shaken the authoritarian regime and
Slobodan Milosevics hold on power who is seen by the Western countries
as the main hindrance to the democratization of Serbia. However, the
expected political unrest and transformation from authoritarian rule to
democracy did not happen. On the contrary, further disrespect for the
law system and the international democratic principles as a whole
appeared. The political stage in FR Yugoslavia is still dominated by
Milosevic who retains control not only of the security forces and military
commands but also of the financial flows and an effective media machine.
Being a good guy and partner of the West (together with the
Croatias president Franjo Tudjman and the leader of the Bosnian
Muslims Alija Izetbegovic, who is now chairman of Bosnias Tripartite
Presidency) concerning the post-Yugoslavia crisis management, now
Milosevic is given the reversed role  he was proclaimed a war criminal
and an enemy of the international community. Driven into a corner, he
has no other option but to stabilize his positions and consolidate his
power. And he will be willing to risk a lot in order to secure these
objectives which makes him even more unpredictable and places him
out of any control.
1 Anton Parvanov, The Geopolitical Reality in the Balkans After the Dayton Agreement:
Main Trends and Perspectives (Sofia, 1997).
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The isolation and the international sanctions imposed by the
international community on Serbia not only impede the process of internal
political democratization but also strengthen the Serbia governments
unwillingness to compromise and its ability to rally the population against
the outside world. The international embargo additionally increases the
challenge the political opposition in Serbia is faced with. The latter has
not yet developed a strategy to capitalize on public anger with Milosevic,
neither a strategic plan for political changes in Serbia. Now, it is entering
the tenth year of multipartism without any precise political and economic
program to be elaborated.
The last years conflict in Kosovo has also deepened the tension
and confrontations between the two components of the Yugoslav federation,
further loosing the ties between them. Montenegro, the smaller unit in
the federation, has de facto achieved full economic and, to a great extent,
political independence. Federal financial and customs laws, as well as
the jurisdiction of the National Bank of Yugoslavia have been effectively
suspended on the territory of Montenegro and customs barriers have been
erected between the republics. Besides, Montenegro has passed its own
Law on Citizenship and is already establishing its own foreign policy,
abolishing visas for foreigners contrary to the will of the federal
administration. Independently, Montenegrin authorities have increased the
potential of the republics security forces and now the republic has about
10,000 to 15,000 security forces staff2.
As a response to the Montenegrin reforms, the Yugoslav authorities
have taken countermeasures, as a result of which the Yugoslav Army has
remained the only one common federal institution that still act on the
territory of the both republics within the framework of the Yugoslav
federation. These countermeasures include as follows:
2 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 125: March 17, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200003.html; Internet; accessed
March 18, 2000.
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n Creation of paramilitary formations from within the ranks of
the Yugoslav Army (Voiska Jugoslava, VJ) in Montenegro that owe
allegiance only to Belgrade.
n Suspension of all dinar payments between Montanegro and Serbia.
n Ban on the import and export of goods between the two
republics within the Yugoslav federation.
n Ban on the Montenegrin export to third countries, etc.
Kosovo
As a result of the destructive military operation and the large scale ethnic
cleansing, the traditional political and administrative system of the
Kosovo region has been disintegrated. During June and July 1999
international military and civilian organizations entered Kosovo aiming
at providing all forms of government while preparing the people of the
province to take over the responsibility. One year later, UNMIK, the
international administration, which in compliance with UN Resolution
1244 was charged with establishing some kind of workable administration
within Kosovo, has achieved little success. Although, there is small
progress in building some basic civil institutions, a domestic judicial
system and local governance, the key problem of organizing a stable and
democratic multiethnic society remains.
The main obstacle for the international administration effectiveness
has been the political explosive question of the future status of Kosovo,
which is still subject of antagonistic interpretations. Keen to avoid the
Kosovo status issue, the international community has postponed the matter
of a central Kosovo political administration. So, UNMIKs biggest
challenge has turned to be the establishment of a kind of an effective
decision-making system necessary for the resolution of the accumulated
legal, administrative and security problems.
13
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The established Transitional Administrative Council of Kosovo,
which has to act as a collective head of government, has turned out
to be a non-working mechanism. The Kosovo Serbs have not accepted
the agreement and even the last decision of some of the Kosovo Serbs
leaders to participate in it as observers has met the resistance of a
significant part of the Serbs in the province. According to them, any
participation in the work of such provisional institutions before Serbs
refugees return is not of interest to Serbs, as this would freeze the status
quo. The Kosovo Albanians have used this vacuum to institutionalize
KLA in power and strengthen its position as the preeminent political
force in Kosovo. It has succeeded in establishing a strong domination
on the civil administration of the province and has turned to be de
facto its government.
The absence of a clear legal framework has also been a result
of the confusions over the future status of Kosovo. The Albanians judges
do not want to apply the Yugoslav laws valid in the province until the
start of the NATO campaign arguing that they are discriminative. As a
result, pre-1989 laws are applied  that is the law system that existed
before the suspension of the Kosovo autonomy. Just because of the legal
anarchy, the fragile judicial system as well as the wrong policy of the
international community, power in the province is now held not by
pluralistic and democratic structures but by private power structures and
mafia organizations interested in the preservation of the chaos and lack
of effective authority. Despite the regulations of the UN Resolution 1244
 it is enacted that wider Kosovo autonomy be created within the
framework of Serbia, as well as the reservations of most of the countries,
the Yugoslav sovereignty is effectively being suspended. Although, the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Bernard Kouchner
has declared that he does not have a mandate to create an independent
Kosovo, the process of disentangling Kosovos administration as well as
its economy from Yugoslav jurisdiction continues to move the province
towards self-governing state entity.
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The implementation of the UN Resolution has been additionally
hampered because of the shortages in the administrations annual budget.
Bernard Kouchner, has openly complained that UNMIK is understaffed
and lacks the necessary funds to administer Kosovo property. Only 3,000
of the promised 6,000 international police officers are currently on duty
in the province and only about half of the $2.2 billion in foreign aid
has been delivered3.
Economic effects
The ethnic conflicts and inter-communal wars in former Yugoslavia have
dramatically reduced the relatively high performance of the former
Yugoslav economy and living standards of the people. As a result of
the last NATO campaign against Serbia, the countrys heavy and light
industries, agriculture, and infrastructure have suffered huge damages that
have provoked a deep economic crisis. Instead of humanitarian assistance
and considerable international economic and financial support, which
Yugoslavia eagerly needed, the country has received new embargo and
new international sanctions. Serbia has remained isolated and has not
been permitted to open up its economic system to the world. There has
been no legal basis for any flow of capital, for trade in goods and services.
In that situation, the country has chosen the only way it possesses to
defend and develop its economy, its home and foreign trade  it has
withdrawn resources from the legal sector to the gray sector of
transactions, which has led to complete criminalization of the states
economy as well as of the region as a whole.
Unlike its isolationist policy towards Serbia, the international
community has applied a different approach related to Kosovo, directly
involving in the reconstruction of the province. But one year after the
military campaign of NATO a lot of fundamental problems still remain
3 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 126: March 21, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200003.html; Internet; accessed March
23, 2000.
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unresolved. There still are not any serious results in reviving economic
activities, in providing any Kosovo administration revenue and in
lessening strong dependence on foreign aid. There is no significant
progress in the rebuilding of the economic and service infrastructure.
Although the UN administration has implemented a number of measures,
such as introducing the German mark as the official currency and
establishing customs and import duties, it is estimated that till now
humanitarian projects have failed to meet even 10% of the need.
Given the international communitys difficulties in restructuring the
province, in controlling the situation, and in preventing the rise of
organized crime, it is not surprisingly that the regional economic activities
are completely dominated by powerful Albanian clan mafia structures,
which gradually turn the region into an entirely criminal area. Without
an effective law and order system, and enjoying the tacit support of the
international forces those groups that are closely related to KLA are
gaining strength and threaten to destabilize the security situation in the
Balkan region.
Security effects
NATO operation against Yugoslavia has not succeeded in establishing
a stable peace and security on the Balkans neither in creating an integrated
approach to regional security mostly because it has failed to break down
the two major sources of instability and tension in the region. These are
the Yugoslav military and police forces and the Albanian extremist
elements.
Yugoslav military and police forces
Despite Serbias political, economic and military weakness following the
last two wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Yugoslav Army is still a
significant security factor at the regional level. Yugoslav President retains
control of security forces and is still strongly supported by the Yugoslav
16
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Army (Voiska Jugoslava, VJ). It is led by loyal to Milosevic hard-line
generals who continue to obey only him and his decisions, disrespecting
the Federal Supreme Defense Council. For the time being, there are no
clear signals that the status quo could be changed and that the
dissatisfaction among the lower ranks could grow up in a way that the
army to turn against the regime. On the contrary, the appointment of
Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic (who is among the top political figures indicted
for war crimes by the tribunal in The Hague along with Milosevic) as
federal defense minister and of Nebojsa Pavkovic (who is one of the
ideologues of the war with NATO) as Chief of the General Staff could
lead to the further deterioration of the situation in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. Besides, the largest item of 2000 year Yugoslavias budget
was intended for financing the defense of the country and the Yugoslav
Armys expenses  73 % of the $1.94 billion total; 25 % of Serbias
year 2000 budget was allocated for the Milosevics controlled police
forces4.
Having the authority with the military and police forces, Slobodan
Milosevic could use some Balkan flashpoints to detract attention from
serious domestic problems, on the one hand, and to challenge the Western
countries and the regional security system that has been imposed by them,
on the other hand. The developments in the northern Kosovo town of
Mitrovica (the largest remaining minority enclave) have proved that
NATO has not deprived Serbia to influence events in Kosovo and to
destabilize the region. Yugoslav Armys special operations and many
training exercises near the Kosovo border, its ability to sustain the
presence of federal forces in Montenegro as well as the occupation of
the civilian areas of the Podgorica airport by army units could be
estimated as such a signal from the Yugoslav President to the international
community that he is still in command of sufficient military force which
may turn the country and the whole region into a new battlefield. And,
a new conflict means further destabilization and isolation of the whole
4 V.I.P. Daily News Report, December 6, 1999.
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region. It means that the Balkans will remain cut off from Europe, serving
only as a cordon sanitaire around Yugoslavia and that the efforts for
serious regional cooperation and security structures will be additionally
hindered.
The Albanian factor
In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
has not been transformed nor it has been removed from the political scene
in Kosovo. Its well-preserved remnants have in fact remained a powerful
and active factor in the province. Part of the guerrillas have established
a new political party, the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo, others
have joined the new Kosovo Protection Corps (a kind of national guard
for emergency and disaster response, which the Albanians intend at some
future time to turn into a permanent army of an independent Kosovo)
or Kosovo Police Service. There is, however, a significant part that is
still involved into broad range of corrupt and illegal activities, including
organized crime and violation. This group of former KLA members still
threaten the future of Kosovo as well as of the neighboring states,
especially those, where the Albanian Diaspora has established a strong
presence.
As the international forces suffer difficulties in controlling the
security situation and in preventing the rise of organizes crime, they have
not made any serious systematic efforts to confront and destroy all KLA
structures. Supplying and supporting KLA forces during the conflict, in
the post-crisis period NATO troops have not strongly opposed to them
nor to their major aim    the establishment of an independent mono
-ethnic Kosovo. Holding positions of considerable power and enjoying
easy access to weapons, most of the KLA members have completely
disregarded international communitys mission for a peaceful and
multiethnic Kosovo and have involved into violent and criminal activities.
They undertook a new campaign of mass scale human rights violation
where the roles were reversed. Ethnic cleansing and systematic abuse
18
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of human rights mainly over the Serb population but also over other
ethnic communities (Roma, Turks, Goranci, etc) has taken place in the
view of the KFOR units. According to official estimates, following the
withdrawal of the Serbia forces about 350,000 non-Albanians left Kosovo,
among them about 270,000 Serbs5.
The international administration, having difficulty in meeting its
target for number of international police, cannot succeed in confronting
the present human rights abuses and in establishing a working cooperation
with the different units of the KLA. Instead of adopting an effective
method for protecting the ethnic minorities in the province, KFOR and
UNMIK have opted to establish protected zones mostly for Serbs, which
have turned to be merely crisis spots with a growing dissension between
the two communities and radicalization of both sides (more than half
of the Serb population live in north Mitrovica and the surrounding area,
which means that there are only 40,000 in all the rest of the province).
KFOR has made little progress in establishing law and order and is
gradually losing control in these special zones, becoming even target of
Albanian violence. NATO has been placed into an embarrassing position
of defending itself and its mission against those it basically went in to
defend. The prolonged violence in Mitrovica have become a symbol of
the helplessness of the international administration to pacify the resistance
of both Serbs and Albanians, to force them to live together in harmony
and have gradually undermined the mission of the international forces
in Kosovo. The proposals for increased international presence in the
province have additionally illustrated NATOs incapacity to establish firm
control of the extremists elements and to guarantee safety and security
in the region.
On the other side, the understaffed police forces, the lack of the
necessary funds, the absence of a clear legal system as well as the
influence and the strong presence of the cruel Albanian mafia have created
5 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 136: May 2, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200005.html; Internet; accessed
May 5, 2000.
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a good climate for criminals and militant groups to prosper. Criminal
organization has appeared, exploring the lack of security and police to
attack property and people belonging to ethnic minority, to steal, harass
and kill citizens across Kosovo. Crime, weapons and drug trafficking is
flourishing in full view of international authorities. It is known that the
so called Balkan route  a smuggling channel from Afghanistan via
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo to Western Europe  that supplies 80 %
of Europes heroin is dominated exactly by the Kosovo Albanians who
rely on clan loyalties to tightly control the whole business6. International
experts consider that the Kosovo drug smugglers are handling up to
five tons of heroin a month, more than twice the quantity they were
trafficking before the war7. The Balkan route is not only a way for them
to make enormous profit but also a way to smuggling weapons in the
Balkan region.
Becoming increasingly secure in their authorities over Kosovo, the
Albanian militants begin to struggle between each other for power 
either political or criminal  and for control over those lucrative criminal
activities. Gradually, the incidents of inter-ethnic violence are being
muffled by rifts and battles between different KLA leaders and
fractures. The international forces are not able or simply do not want
to impose control over those organized crime elements nor do they risk
to interfere into internal KLA struggles, which in addition stimulates the
criminalization of Kosovo and shakens the security situation on the
Balkans.
While the main civilian bodies, the UN and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, keep on being subject to
contradictions and disputes, the substantial security threats in the region
6 Stratfor, The Global Intelligence Update Kosovo: One Year later, March 17, 2000;
available from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special26.htm; Internet; accessed
March 20, 2000.
7 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 142: May 23, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200005.html; Internet; accessed May
30, 2000.
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 Yugoslav military structures and Albanian extremist elements  are
gaining strength and emanate constant threat to seriously challenge peace
and security in the region. Both the Yugoslav army and the Albanians
have retained their potential of provoking and maintaining ethnic conflicts
and for that reason they remain a enormous threat to the development
and the peaceful reconstruction of the whole region. Any new confrontation
between them could not only undermine the basic security in the province
but could also spill out smuggling, crime and violence into the whole
Balkan region destabilizing the fragile balance established within it. Any
further confrontation in the region and creation of an independent
Albanian Kosovo will mean destabilization, as it would encourage
Albanians in the southern part of Serbia proper, in Macedonia, and in
Montenegro to make similar demands. It would provoke a chain reaction
of self  determination aspirations and bring about intensification of
the existing contradictions between Macedonians and Albanians within
Macedonia. The aggravation of the tension in Macedonia with its
precarious ethnic balance will have an effect on Bulgaria, which maintain
close relations with it. On the other side, an independent Kosovo could
provoke a domino effects and strengthen the nationalist aspirations not
only in Western Macedonia but also in Bosnia and in Sandzak    an
area covering the north of Montenegro and south-west of Serbia. The
ethnic Muslims are the largest ethnic group in Sandzak. They have strong
family and other ties with the Bosnian Muslims and a possible secession
of Kosovo could intensify the strivings for strengthened relations with
Bosnia and even for breaking away from Serbia. The establishment of
an independent Kosovo state could also undermine the fragile inter-ethnic
tolerance between the different ethnic communities in Bosnia. It could
make them destroy the Dayton accords and lead to destabilization of the
Balkan region as a whole. Greece and Turkey, both NATO member states
with important national interests on the Balkans, would also be affected
and upset with such a development of the regional security situation.
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Cordon Sanitaire around FR Yugoslavia 
The New Regional Security System
The Kosovo crisis and its aftermath have brought about significant
changes to the security environment on the Balkans which call for the
development of a new security system for the region. The process of
defining a new security system has been underlined basically by the idea
that the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic is the main obstacle for
the achievement of the main purposes of the international community
related to the region of Southeastern Europe.
The West has already tried to overthrow Milosevic by using several
means. First, it was the blockade imposed on Yugoslavia, then came the
NATO attacks with the hope that popular discontent from the damages
and the loss of Kosovo are enough to weaken his power. This did not
happen, and after the hot phase of the conflict the Western countries
has imposed a cordon sanitaire around Serbia. Both by political and
economic measures, the West tries to strengthen the isolation of the
republic, to tighten the noose around the regime in Belgrade, to limit
the most destabilizing effects proceeding from it and finally to gain its
major purpose    political, economic and military integration of the
whole region.
The Southeast European Stability Pact has also been designed in
a way that suppose the establishment of a ring around Serbia, which would
gradually reduce its strategic importance. The European Union member
states has emphasized that only democratic and cooperative Serbia, living
at peace with its neighbors, will be welcome to join the European family
and will enjoy the funds necessary for the development and reconstruction
of the country. Thus, instead of support and cooperation, the Western
countries have chosen selective sanctions as the basic means for the
achievement of their aims concerning the region.
The establishment of the new security system has seriously affected
Serbias pro-Western oriented neighboring countries converting them into
links of the ring called cordon sanitaire. After the death of its
22
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authoritarian president Franjo Tudjman and the peaceful transfer of power,
Croatia has shown its strong pro-Western orientation and firm determination
to meet the requirements necessary for EU integration. The divisions
within Bosnia still exist and a possible withdrawal of the international
administration could bring about chaos and a new stage of violence.
Hungary is already a NATO member state and is in its way to join
the European Union, while Bulgaria and Romania apply both for EU
and NATO membership. Even Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania,
despite their political and economic problems, have proved their pro-
Western orientation and their will to cooperate with the Western countries.
Playing the role of a buffer zone between Serbia and the Western
countries, all neighboring countries are exposed to a double pressure both
external and internal  on the one hand, they are exposed to the negative
impact of Belgrades status, and on the other hand, to the threat of further
turbulence within FR Yugoslavia.
Internal Pressure
During the last ten years Slobodan Milosevic has proved that the key
element of his strategy for political survival is on the one hand, his ability
to provoke and direct the nationalist sentiments of the Serb population,
and on the other hand, his ability to spill out crisis distracting the public
attention from the domestic political situation. The latter is extremely
important for the neighbors of a country which is in full isolation and
under international sanctions.
Faced with a total isolation, the Yugoslav President has no other
way to respond to the impending threat but to export the internal
tensions and to internationalize the crisis. If he does not succeed in
spreading the crisis beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, it would burst
within the framework of the country and would oust him from power.
On the contrary, the extension of the conflict area and the spilling over
of the tensions into zones outside the countrys territory would immediately
relieve domestic pressure and increase leaders possibility to strengthen
23
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his grip on power and to successfully manage the situation in his country.
In this case, the conflict will be transferred to the territory of the
neighboring state, especially to those, where the same conflict premise
does exist. Which are these countries? On the first place, these are
Macedonia and Montenegro because of the significant number of
Albanians living within their framework. In Macedonia the Albanians
constitute one third of the Macedonian population, while in Montenegro
they are about one sixth of the population. Sandzak and Bosnia will also
be among the most threatened areas because of their predominant Muslim
population. In Sandzak, which borders Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia and
which is a strategic passage to the Adriatic, the Muslim are claiming
territorial and political autonomy. The Bosnian Serb factor must also be
taken into account because of the fragility of the peace in Bosnia and
because of the still existing strategy of rapprochement with the
motherland.
Refugee problems, which will inevitably emerge with the spread
of the conflict will additionally destabilize the security situation in the
neighboring countries and can lead to strong fragmentation in the region.
Forced to flee from the conflict area, refugees could carry the struggles
and tensions with them. They could pose a threat to the states that have
accepted them because of increased political, economic, social, or cultural
tensions. In this sense, refugees flows must be treated as a projection
of ethnic conflict onto the territory of another country by other means
that increase the danger of being drawn into the conflict8. Such extension
of the conflict could undermine the precarious ethnic balance and
compromise and provoke serious confrontations in those countries, which
consequently would affect the stability and security situation in the rest
of the Balkan states and would stir up old  ethnic and nationalist strives.
8 Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Timothy L. Thomas, International Ramifications of Yugoslavia’s
Serial Wars: the Challenge of Ethnonational Conflicts for a Post-Cold War, European
Order.
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External Pressure
NATO military operation against Serbia has not shaken seriously
Milosevics power. The Yugoslav President has once again revived
nationalism and has diverted public attention away from Yugoslavias
domestic problems. So, the threat of a new regional conflict still exists
and the proximity of the area of potential destabilization as well as the
possibility that the conflict could spill over directly threatens security
of the Western countries. Any economic, social and political difficulties
(migration and refugees, mafias, arms transfers, etc.) in Southeastern
Europe would affect the rest of the continent. Any destabilization would
have a negative effect on the European integration process and security9.
To reduce those possible negative effects, the Western countries have
imposed cordon sanitaire around Yugoslavia aiming at:
n Preventing the tensions and the waves of instability from spilling
over into the rest of the continent.
n Increasing political, economic and military pressure over the
regime in Belgrade in order a peaceful settlement of the conflict to be
achieved.
n Overthrowing the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and
democratization of Serbia.
Aiming at the isolation of Serbia and the containment of the
tensions within it, the embargo in fact directly affected the peripheral
states bringing them significant damages in the following aspects:
9 Reinhardt Rummel, “Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention”
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Institutional Aspect
Countries in the region share a fragile institutional system of democracy,
which is yet to be filled with real substance. The isolation of Yugoslavia,
however, indirectly hamper their institutional modernization and
stabilization. It slows down the administrative reforms, the current process
of democratization and transformation as a whole. The pressure exerted
both by Yugoslavia and the international community reduce the efficiency
of the administrative reform, slow up the decentralization of the decision
-making process and additionally impede the process of combating
corruption. On the other side, the weakness of the public institutions
seriously challenge not only the existing order but also civic security
in general. Organized crime, illegal economy, large scale corruption and
violation of citizens rights is a direct consequence of state institutions
inability to enforce law and order.
Economic Aspect
The war in Kosovo has severely affected the regional economy. The
destruction of the Danube bridges has not only disrupted Yugoslav Army
supply routes but has also blockade river trade and has heavily damaged
the industries of the Balkan countries. Trade between Balkan states now
accounts for just 14 percent of the regions economic activity, and has
little chance of increasing10. Furthermore, the international communitys
embargo on Belgrade has led to the isolation of the economic system
of the region from the international markets. It has brought about trade
isolation, poor investment and credit rating of the Balkan countries and
has additionally reduced their chances as an emerging market to attract
investment and to intensify their participation in international commerce.
10 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 136: May 2, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200005.html; Internet; accessed May
5, 2000.
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Besides, the international sanctions on Yugoslavia have slowed down the
privatization process in industry and banking as well as the reconstruction
of the regional infrastructure network that is a basis for the economic
resurgence of the Balkans. The isolationist approach imposed by the
international community has undermined the possibilities for regional
economic cooperation and integration, and the creation of a common
regional economic system where a key role in economic settlement will
not belong to the international financial institution but to the countries
in the region.
The Stability Pact has been designed as a long-term strategy to
promote economic stabilization and integration of the Balkans to the rest
of Europe, i.e. to promote the main prerequisite for the regional stability
and security. So far, this initiative has been associated with a bad
organization, bureaucratic approach and a lack of coordination between
the international institutions rather than with any significant results in
the economic development and reconstruction of the Balkans.
The main EU strategy that underlies Stability Pact program aims
at cutting Serbia out of a growing network of cross-border development.
Corridor IV, for example, is a large infrastructural project that will be
the first road and rail link between Greece and Western Europe, which
does not go through Serbia (till now transport through Yugoslavia was
the fastest and the cheapest way of getting goods to markets in Central
and Western Europe). Corridor VIII, an infrastructure area connecting
Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia, has just the same aim. In general, all
EU plans exclude Serbia from the existing development schemes as long
as Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. However,
the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the reconstruction process additionally
brings in question the success of all development and stabilization
programs. Undoubtedly, an overall process of stabilization, economic
reconstruction and development of the region cannot be accomplished
without the participation of Yugoslavia, which has an important geographical
location within the infrastructure network.
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Security Aspect
Transforming Yugoslavia into a black hole at the heart of the Balkans,
the international community has not only made impossible the
implementation of real and effective regional institutional and economic
integration but has also impeded the establishment of a stable security
order on the Balkans. The imposition of the cordon sanitaire as a regional
security system model contravenes the very essence of the purposes that
the international community set a year ago. The isolation of Yugoslavia
dooms to failure any attempt a higher level of national and regional
security to be achieved through coordinated foreign policy actions of all
the states in the region. It deprives of legal base any coordination of
the states efforts to solve problems of mutual interest and to stabilize
the security situation on the Balkans.
The new regional security system has not succeeded in developing
a new type of relationships and interstate behavior and in resolving the
problems related to cooperation and security. It is still impossible for
the countries in the region to identify and develop a common regional
interest, to develop a more stable relationship and to increase the level
of confidence in order to improve the security situation. It seems that
the integrity of the national interests of the countries in the region
developed during the Kosovo crisis has been broken. Even more, some
inherited or later developed problems re-emerged breaking the compromise
between the different interests and bringing about new stage of
misunderstanding and discords.
The international sanctions have strongly affected the security
situation in the region. They have boosted the local mafia economics
and have supported the corruption process among politicians and civil
servants. Consequently, the corruption of the administrative bodies has
allowed crime and smuggling to flourish and is gradually converting the
region into an area dominated by international criminal structures and
different interest groups, which are gaining political influence.
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The Key International Players:
Discrepancy between Reality and Strategy
NATO
A year ago NATO began military campaign in defense of the human
rights principles but without a clear political program concerning the post-
crisis period. Hoping that the popular discontent from the damages caused
by the NATO attacks and the sustained international sanctions will
seriously shaken Milosevics hold on power, the realization of the strategy
of the western countries has been closely related to Milosevics ousting
from power and Serbias democratization. The preservation of the political
status quo in FR Yugoslavia has brought to a discrepancy between the
real situation on the Balkans and  the created strategy of the international
community concerning this situation. In the absence of well-defined
strategy, which strongly to correspond to the real political, security and
economic situation on the Balkans, as well as of a good framework for
coordination, the international community has confronted the difficult
issue concerning the application of those purposes that have been set
before NATOs operation against Serbia.
NATO commitment to the development, reconstruction, and the
stabilization of the Balkan region has been an important instrument in
the containment of the strives between the regional conflict parties. KFOR
force has prevented the spread of the conflict and the creation of new
flash points on the Balkans that could damage the precarious regional
balance as well as the European stability as a whole. However, the
complex mission of carrying out of a long-term peace process also creates
some concerns which could have serious consequences for NATOs unity
and credibility. One year after the deployment of the international forces
in Kosovo, NATO seems to be placed in a very delicate situation
confronting the national interests and aspirations of the both conflict
parties. On the one side, the Alliance does not stand for the return to
Serb rule over the province nor it wants to negotiate with Milosevic who
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still retains his ability to influence the developments within the province.
On the other side, NATO opposes the creation of an independent Albanian
state in Kosovo, which being inevitably followed by ethnic cleansing
against the Serb population, would undermine the positions of all NATO
member states government and would bring advantages to the internal
political opposition in those countries. The peacekeeping mission is
further impeded by the lack of common perception and the split between
the positions of the United States and those of the EU countries
concerning their obligations related to the Kosovo problem. The pre-war
understanding has obliged the United States to finance the war, and
Europe  Kosovos post-war reconstruction and development. Washington
has really contributed two thirds of the military operation in Kosovo and
now is prone to accuse its European allies for not pulling their weight
in Kosovo especially in terms of the civilian reconstruction and restoring
civil administration.
Worrying about the lack of progress in establishing a stable peace
in the province and being especially sensitive about exposing to risk their
troops during the presidential election campaign, the United States
subsequently placed new restrictions on the deployment of US forces
around the province (consequently, all but three of the Alliance member
states present in Kosovo have done the same). Even more, the United
States are overly determined to hold elections in the province in October,
at any cost, in order to withdraw their troops as soon as possible11.
11 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report Issue 135: April 26, 2000;
available from http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkans_200004.html; Internet; accessed May
5, 2000.
30
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Spring 2000
The European Union
Although the Kosovo crisis was estimated as a catalyst for the growing
integrity of Europe in terms of security and defense issues, in the post-
crisis period the European Union risks once again allowing the United
States to take priority in what is called European security space. With
the persistent contradictions among the EU member states concerning the
distribution of the financial burden as well as the political significance
of the Stability Pact and the whole reconstruction process, the Western
European countries  whose troops make up 80% of KFOR  further
impede the success of the peacekeeping mission. Besides, the EU inability
to define a common position on clear strategy and priorities in
Southeastern Europe and on the means to realize it could undermine the
process of establishment of a common European security and defense
mechanism that is a guarantor of the stability in the region.
In April 2000 KFOR has been placed under the direction of the
Eurocorps, an alliance made up of troops from Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. The new commander of the peacekeeping
troops, General Juan Ortuno, has listed the protection of minorities and
helping the organization of elections as his top priorities. This statement
as well as the very handover to the Eurocorps involves an increase of
the importance of the European Unions contribution to Kosovo budget
and security.
Russia
NATO campaign against Belgrade has also brought about a split between
the positions of NATO member states and Russia, which had lost a great
deal of its influence in the region. Being Serbias traditional supporter,
Russia strongly criticized the Alliances bombings on it. In the post-crisis
period Russian government has many times expressed its disapproval of
the NATO peacekeeping strategy, which according to the Russias official
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position, tolerates and is completely in favor of the ethnic Albanians and
their separatist aspirations. Confirming its strategic interests on the
Balkans, Russia has insisted to get a more substantive role for the
Russians troops in KFOR and has even offered its own idea for the
settlement of the problems in Kosovo emphasizing on the following
prerequisites:
n Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FR
Yugoslavia.
n Negotiations on the status of Kosovo within the framework of
FR Yugoslavia.
n Strengthening the border control between FR Yugoslavia and
Macedonia and between FR Yugoslavia and Albania.
n Guaranteeing the return of refugees and the co-existence of
people of different nationality and ethnicity.
Russias stand is that Belgrade should play an important role in
the process of stabilization and development of the Balkan region. In
this sense, Russian policy firmly opposes the strategy of the Western
country related to the post crisis security order on the Balkans. Whereas
the new regional security system imposed by the West is based on the
total isolation of Serbia because of the Milosevics regime, Russia rejects
all international sanctions against Serbia and supports the full integration
of Yugoslavia into the common Balkan reconstruction and development
process.
The existing conflict of interests within the international
community additionally impede and defer the settlement of the
existing disputes between the countries in the Balkan region. The
difficulties faced by the key international players in adopting
common positions and implementing their decisions also have
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repercussions among the countries in the region12. The clash between
the opposite special political and economic interests as well as the
disintegration of the international community views about the
processes in the Southeastern Europe best serves the interests of the
different conflicting groups in the region. Each of these conflict
groups consolidates its positions, mobilizes its internal forces and
tries to gain the favor and the good will of some of the great
international players in achieving its own particular interest. The
following intensification of the existing confrontations will make
impossible a compromise to be worked out and hence, a regional
political and economic integration as well as a collective security
framework to be established.
12 Sophia Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the
FYR of Macedonia, Chaillot Papers 30 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western
European Union, December 1997).
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Conclusion
A year ago NATO started a military operation against Serbia in order
to put an end to mass-scale violation of fundamental human rights,
repression and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. After the hot phase
of the conflict these actions have not been succeeded by an appropriate
post-crisis politico-military strategy backed by the indispensable unity of
the international community. Consequently, the fragile peace in Kosovo
has done nothing to resolve the long-term issue of Kosovo status, leaving
both the Serb aim of Yugoslav sovereignty and the KLAs aim for
independence of the territory legitimized.
On the one hand, NATO commitment to the development and
stabilization of the Southeastern Europe region has prevented the spill
over of the tensions and struggles from Kosovo to the rest of the region
as well as further destabilization of the precarious regional security
balance. On the other hand, the complex post-crisis mission has turned
out to be the more difficult task for the international community provoking
some confusion between its objectives and policy implemented. Until
now, the international forces in Kosovo have failed to demonstrate a clear
mastery of the situation despite its troops and civil administration. They
have failed to provide for security and reconstruction, to reinstate rule
of law and to build an effective law enforcement and justice system in
the province. Both KFOR forces and the UN police contingent have not
succeeded neither in preventing armed conflict and ensuring public safety
and order, nor in deterring and clearing up crime, much of which is ethnic
in motivation, nor in stopping violence and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
This ineffective authority has allowed a serious power vacuum to develop,
which Albanian criminal structures closely related to KLA have used to
impose their direct rule over the territory of the province, to force out
most of the Serb and other non-Albanian population and to get closer
to their supreme aim  independent Albanian Kosovo.
The new security order imposed on the Balkans after the Kosovo
war has been based on the full isolation of Belgrades regime considered
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as the main security threat for the region. The developments of the
regional situation during the last one year, however, have proved that
the cordon sanitaire and the isolation of a conflict area as a means
for the settlement of problems is counterproductive in short and media
term.
On the first place, it has deprived the international community
of any lever and a means of control over Belgrades regime. On the
second place, the embargo against Serbia has aggravated the internal
economic crisis not only in FRY but equally in neighboring countries.
It has impeded the development of bilateral relations among the countries
in the region as well as the establishment of a true Balkan market, which
further slows down the process of political and economic reconstruction
throughout the region.
On the third place, the non-participation of the state concerned
into the international decision-making process has undermined the very
foundation of cooperative security policy. It seems that any attempt to
stabilize the Balkans without including the country that is at the regions
core is doomed to failure. The desire to contain the regime in Belgrade
has proved to be incompatible with the general efforts to transform the
Balkans into a stability and security zone, and to open the region to
the rest of the world. Therefore, the international community, and
especially the European Union, has to work out a new strategy for the
Balkans underlined by the idea that in the security-building process the
cooperation of the parties directly involved is indispensable and the
international community cannot substitute for them.
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THE PRINCIPLE
OF SELF- DETERMINATION
AND CHANGE OF BORDERS
Marin Lessenski
The expectation for another conflict in the Balkans in the next few months
is based on the upsurge in Southern Serbia, the doubtful results of the
international administration in Kosovo and the tensions between
Montenegro and Serbia. An outburst in any of these vulnerable points
would lead to a chain reaction, igniting other hot spots in the region.
All these problems relate to the concept of self-determination,
which refers to the right of all peoples to freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Basically, this means that a given people are recognized this right and
thus, the political status of a territory they claim are legitimized
internationally. Self-determination could be exercised in different forms,
but the local context and experience implies resort to secession.
Along these lines the complex problems of the Balkans can be
reduced to one question. If the principle of self-determination is to be
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given primacy over the principle of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity, or rather how they will be interpreted, where and when will
applied:
n General application of the principle of (national) self-
determination would mean that the international community would itself
establish or accept the establishment of new political-territorial units. This
would bring about domino effect in the region, offering the possibility
of redrawing existing boundaries, reopening of recent conflicts and
starting of new ones.
n Preserving the status quo would avoid open confrontations
in the short run, but is based on wishful thinking, because it does not
offer answers neither to the status of Kosovo, the future of Montenegro
in FRY, nor to the concrete long-term international involvement in the
region.
n Selectively resolving each case, in accordance with the specific
conflict potential, timing and prospects for sustainable results (this is in
fact keeping the present behavior). Though past experience has shown
this is not part of a grand strategy, this option is the most likely to happen,
because it offers more flexible solutions, coherent with the international
community interests and the facts on the ground.
The contradictions between the principles of self-determination,
including international humanitarian intervention and sovereignty of
states, including territorial integrity for the Balkans does not comprise
only a debate on the changing character of international law or human
rights issue, but has also its serious security dimensions. The application
of the principle of self-determination in the case of Kosovo (e.g.
independent Kosovo) would trigger the disintegration of the federation
between Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Bosnian-Croat Federation, the territorial integrity of Serbia and
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Montenegro themselves, Macedonia, and will affect the rest of the
countries in the region.
Besides the implications of the international normative
framework, the issues are further complicated by the size and the
strength of the local factors and by the intentions and controversial
results of international factors in their peace-enforcing, peacekeeping
and state-building efforts.
Regional Implications:
The Logic of the Domino Effect
The current developments in the regional situation, even at a first glance,
suggest that if one change occurs in the status of the different political-
territorial units, it is likely to have grave impact on other subject in the
international system in the Balkans.
Recognizing a distinctive political status of Kosovo (independence),
for example would trigger the separation between Montenegro and Serbia
and a final dismemberment of FR Yugoslavia. This would give ground
for Republica Srpska to claim integration with Serbia, and subsequently
make the Bosnian-Croatian Federation within the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina meaningless. The Croatian population would request union
with Croatia, leaving pieces of territory to the Bosnian Muslims. In Serbia
itself the vulnerable points will erupt  South Serbia with its Albanian
minority; the Muslims of Sandzac would first seek independence from
Serbia and Montenegro respectively, unification of the two parts of the
region and then integration with what is left of Bosnia; Vojvodina would
either seek autonomy or its Hungarians will join Hungary. If this is the
north-north-west direction of the next Balkan conflict, its south-south-
east dimensions would ensue from an All-Albanian unification aspirations,
disintegrating Macedonia and destabilizing Bulgaria and Greece.
Speculating about the Balkans future and redrawing its map makes
sense only in case enough evidence is provided to back up this scenario.
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For analytical purposes, the controversies between the principles of self-
determination and state sovereignty and inviolability of borders has to
be examined, then to distinguish the peculiarities of each case in terms
of normative framework, actual situation, conflict potential, and the role
of domestic and external factors.
The implication of the principle of self-determination in international
relations goes beyond the Balkan situation. It is not only a legal or human
rights issue  its security aspects are likely to launch the domino effect
all over again, affecting the whole region. The balance between the right
of people to self-determination (including secession) while upholding the
principle of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states poses a major
challenge for the region in the coming century.
The Principles of Self-determination
and State Sovereignty as Legal Issues
The principle of self-determination was first mentioned as such in Articles
1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter as a basis for the development of friendly
relations between states. Subsequently, self-determination described the
right of all peoples to freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.13 Along these
lines self-determination could be referred to as the right of the people
to determine freely their political status, ranging from independence,
union or free association with another state. The importance of the
principle is that it also relates to territoriality, i.e. it is an international
recognition of a distinct status granted to a territory.
The principle of self-determination comes in odds with the
commonly accepted principle of sovereignty of states, including inviolability
13 UN, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 1514 (XV): Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960.
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of state frontiers, as stipulated in the UN Charter and consequent
documents, and in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE.14 The territory
of a state is guaranteed by commonly accepted norms, which is not yet
overridden by self-determination in international relations.
Resolution 1514 (xv) of 1960, adopted by the UN General
Assembly, called Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, also tries to accommodate the discrepancies
between these two norms. After defining (somewhat vaguely) what the
right to self-determination is, the Resolution claims that:
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
These developments have attached a colonial context to self-
determination, and it applied to colonies, dependent and trust territories
14 CSCE, Helsinki Final Act. 1975.
1.(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States. The
ten principles are I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; II.
Refraining from the threat or use of force; III. Inviolability of frontiers; IV. Territorial
integrity of States; V. Peaceful settlement of disputes; VI. Non-intervention in internal
affairs; VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,including the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief ; VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of
peoples; IX. Cooperation among States X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under
international law.  Principle VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples says that:
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-
determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law,
including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal
and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish
their political, economic, social and cultural development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective
exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly
relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the
elimination of any form of violation of this principle.
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and not metropolitan states. The CSCE principles several years later were
adopted in another context  Cold War confrontation in Europe and
self-determination implied probably for the West the possibility of Eastern
block peoples to change the political system, while to the East the right
to maintain that system.
In the post-Cold War period, with the break up of the Eastern
block, self-determination used to refer not only to secession from a parent
state (like USSR and SFRY), but also the will of the Eastern nations
to change the socialist system to liberal democracy. In this regard, the
principle of self-determination did not embody a legal right, but rather
a political will.
Balkans Model of Conflict Management
Conflict prevention and conflict management in the Balkans has been
defined by their goals, legalizing norms, mechanisms and instruments of
involvement and intervention, and has their external (out-of-region) and
internal (regional) constraints.
The global objectives of international intervention have been
to end violence and secure international peace. This has been justified
through humanitarian intervention cause because of gross breaches of
human rights and threat to international peace. International intervention
has been carried out by different actors  individual states, UN,
OSCE, Council of Europe, the European Community (later the
European Union), NATO, specially designed organs, like the Contact
Group, but the principal instrument of intervention has been multilateral
intervention.
The external constraints to international involvement in the crises
are the different and changing interests and resources of the players at
the international scene, the institutional specifics of the international
organizations that have been involved in the crises and of course the
existing international normative framework concerning the crises.
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Ethnic politics, be it ethnic nationalism or ethnonationalism, has
the greatest relative strength among the internal constraints to conflict
resolution (and main perpetrator). In other words, this is the principle
of nationalism which holds that the national unit should be congruent
with the political unit15  every nation should have its state. So conflict
managers in the Balkans have to balance between ethnic politics,
reworded in political projects and the acting international normative
framework and the other external factors.
Once taken into account, the proposed solutions should be tested
against the capacities of the executors of proposed solutions on the ground
in a long-term perspective. This actually means the capacity of states
(or state-like entities), responsible for hosting institutional solutions to
residing conflicts and implementing policy arrangements.
The possible institutional solutions to the conflicts should be able
to accommodate the consequences of self-determination with international
stability, the forms being international protectorates, federal or confederate
structures, consociational arrangements, cantonization, all of them
introduced in the environment of democratic regimes.
International response to the recurring Balkan crises has been quite
diverse; nonetheless there are some constant features, which include
emergence of precedents of policy decisions, actions and outcomes.
Hence, one could claim the evolvement of a model, based on precedent-
based reasoning on behalf of the members of the international community,
with all the limitations specified above which could outline the possible
policy options for conflict management in the Balkans.
15 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
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Perimeters of Self-determination
References to self-determination always call for identification of the
beneficiary of this right  is it nationally/ethnically defined, or does
it apply to a population of a given territory, who are claiming this
right.
“The Peoples”
The current normative framework does not provide enough hints for a
clear answer to the question: who has the right to self-determination, i.e.
how peoples is defined? This is a paramount question, since social
science disciplines have vested efforts, for practical reasons, in
distinguishing first between nation and state, and then between
different forms of human collectivities such as nations, ethnic groups
and related phenomenon such as ethnicity, ethnie, minorities, nationalism,
ethnonationalism, etc.
In historical perspective, the principle of self-government,
introduced by President Wilson, used to refer to the ethnic groups,
constituting the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires. In the 1950s and
60s, self-determination was largely applied to colonial people. In
practice, the newly emerging states were demarcated along the borders
of former colonies, without taking into account ethnic divides. Thus,
most of the post-colonial states are comprised of different ethnic groups,
subsequently competing for control of state power or secession.
In short, international normative framework has failed to indicate
the criteria to which a given group has the right to pursue legitimately
self-determination policies. Inevitably, within the still nation-state
system of international relations, the groups, aspiring to a greater
autonomy or independence are usually described as separatists and/or
ethnonationalists.
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Levels of Self-Determination
Self-determination, along political regulation of conflict, is a question
first of all of participation and representation. Moreover, self-determination
can be expressed in different forms, ranging from different sorts of
autonomy to full independence, granted to a collectivity of people with
distinct territory, e.g. the right to statehood.
Autonomy itself could be non-territorial and territorial. In cases
of non-territorial autonomy, also referred to as cultural autonomy, power
is devolved from the state to authorities whose jurisdiction is over
individuals defined not in territorial terms but in terms of some cultural
or subjectively defined characteristic (resembling the millet system of the
Ottoman empire).16 In the case of territorial autonomy, rights to self-
government are attached to a group, inhabiting a particular territory.
Indeed, any discussion about self-determination calls also for
clarifying the issue of collective and individual rights. It is not self-evident
that collective rights concept and self-determination go hand by hand.
In international documents, as far as human rights are concerned, it is
implied that beneficiaries are individuals, members of minorities referred
to as to persons belonging to national minorities and not so much to
collective rights17. Analysts claim that inter-state system is very important
when studying secessionist aspirations, i.e. whether the system is
permissive or restrictive.18 In other words, this includes the question of
state policies towards minorities19 and the respective reaction of minorities
against the state.
16 See John Coakley, The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology.
International Political Science Review vol. 13, No 4. (1992): 343-358.
17 OSCE. Paris Charter of the OSCE. 1990.
18 John MacGarry and Brendan OLeary, eds. The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic
Conflict. The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Resolution (Routledge: London-New York,
1993.), 14.
19 Understood here not only in numerical terms, but rather as a group with limited access
to power, economy, etc. or underrepresented in state governance,
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Autonomy in the Balkans
In historical perspective, the particular Balkan experience is indicative
that autonomy in many cases is in fact effective independence. The
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire replicates cases of self-
determination, leading to territorial autonomy and subsequently to
full independence. Suffice to mention Serbia, which was granted
independence only in 1878, or Bulgaria, which proclaimed its
independence thirty years after the Russian-Turkish war of 1878.
Although prior to proclaiming independence they were formally
autonomous territories within the Ottoman Empire, they enjoyed de
facto independence.
More recent case includes the autonomous status of Kosovo,
provided by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. Observers claim that
the Kosovo, though de jure within the confines of Serbia, could not
be controlled by the Republican authorities. On the opposite, the
Kosovo representatives had control over the Republic internal policy
through their participation in the Republics assembly.20 Despite
formally keeping their status, the autonomous provinces of Kosovo
and Vojvodina since the late 80s has been effectively outstripped
from their privileges.21
If their sovereignty and independence are considered formal
basic criteria of different territorial-political units in the Balkans,
the following groups could be distinguished: (1) independent states:
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Turkey; (2) semi-
independent: Greece (member of EU), Montenegro, Serbia (members
of FRY), Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (members of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
20 Veljko Vujacic, Institutional Origins of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism, East
European Constitutional Review, Vol.5, No.4 (fall 1996).
21  Constitution of Serbia. VI Territorial Organisation. The autonomous province of
Vojvodina and the autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.
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Along unitary-federal state axis, the situation is the following:
unitary: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Greece
and Turkey, federal: Yugoslavia and BiH.
Considerations about the internal structure of a state is
important in regard to the specific Balkan experience, since federal
structures are more prone to dismemberment and the successor states
are more easily accepted into the international community. Hence,
autonomous or semi-independent states are more likely to claim
secession.
Four Principles of Legitimizing Rights to a Territory
Claims for secessionist self-determination inevitably relate to the problem
of dividing territories. Susan Woodward distinguishes four principles,
through which served for seeking self-determination in the course of the
Yugoslav crisis  historicist, democratic, Helsinki and realist
one (and the fifth one, introduced by Radovan Karadzic, is based on
land ownership).22
The historicist principle claims a territory through references to
pre-existing historical state. The difficulty with it is that every group and
nation could find a period in its history that gives it the legitimate right
over a territory.
The Helsinki principle defines nation-states with their current
existing borders and views violation of borders as unacceptable. Contesting
existing borders is deemed as a major threat to peace and international
order.
The democratic principle is closer to the general understanding
of self-determination, as it provides for a choice, expressed in a
referendum, of the population of a territory.
22 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995),
212-213.
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The realist principle holds that physical control over a territory,
whether maintained by a legitimate government or achieved by force,
determines the state of affairs.
The Yugoslav Experience  1990-1999
The disintegration of post-World War II Yugoslavia started with the
multi-party elections held in 1990, and then the referenda in the
Republics in 1990-1991, concerning their status within Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
The external (Western European and EC at this stage)
response to the starting disintegration of Yugoslavia was first a stand
on the preservation of the State in the then existing form. The EC
initiated Hague Conference on Yugoslavia in the beginning of
September 1991 adopted a difference stance, providing for the
sovereignty of different republics, which could decide on their
relations with the other members of the federation    so the
projection would be the establishment of a loose federation or
confederation of states.
The Arbitration Committee, established by the EC (known also
as the Badinter Committee) had to assist the EC decisions, regarding
the recognition of new East European States, and especially those
of the SFRY and the USSR.
Slovenia, followed by Croatia received left the federation in
1991. The third republic to emerge from SFRY was Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which declared independence on February 29, 1992,
while Bosnian Serbs proclaimed a separate state of Republika Srpska
on March 27, 1992. The Republic of BiH, under its Muslim
presidency, was recognized by the European Community on April
6, 1992. The international recognition was extended by the acceptance
of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, when they became members of the
United Nations on May 22, 1992.
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The West admitted that the Yugoslav population had self-
determination rights, but the question is to whom and what did it
apply. Obviously, it did circumscribe only an ethnic majority within
existing administrative borders of the republics. Slovenia did not
have large minorities and was perceived as ethnically homogenous,
but Croatia had its numerous Serbian majority, concentrated in
distinct parts of the territory. The vote of this minority to stay within
Yugoslavia was not taken into account by the international community,
neither was the aspiration of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.23
The international responses to the Yugoslav crises since 1990-
1991 are indicative for changes in the interpretation and proposals
for codification of these changes in international normative framework.
Two basic principles  sovereignty of states and inviolability of
borders are challenged by commonly accepted international values.
Observing human rights is a responsibility of the State, but gross
infringements on human rights are of primary concern of international
(UN) and regional organizations (OSCE, COE). There are established
mechanisms for protection of human rights, intervention in state
affairs, but the pending question is of the limitations to external
intervention, its legitimacy and mechanisms. Apart from conspiracy
theories explaining international intervention in the Balkans, the
evident reasons for such interventions so far are protecting
international peace and ceasing human rights violations.
In the beginning of the Yugoslav crises, some actors at the
international scene (Germany and Austria followed by the EC)
decided to recognize the independence of the Yugoslav republics,
which legitimized international intervention. Recognition meant that
Article VII provisions of the UN Charter could be activated, stating
that the activities of the Yugoslav army was an act of aggression
23 See Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,
1995).
48
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Spring 2000
and could be used in restoring international peace. The legal grounds
for intervention in Kosovo several years later was validated by
human rights concerns.
Two Interpretations of Self-determination
The Badinter Committees treatment of the issue of self-determination
results in several conclusions. What is implied in the opinions of the
Committee is that there are two major understandings of self-
determination. The first one confers this right to republics (not constituent
nations in the Yugoslav case), understood as full independence, and the
second one refers to self-determination as a matter of human rights issue,
concerning minorities within the (potentially) sovereign states.
In the first case, these are the Slovene and Croatian appeals for
independence on the basis of the right of every nation to self-
determination. The EC and the Committee de facto and de jure admitted
this right to the Slovene and the Croatian nations, but identified within
the existing republican borders. As far as the then functioning Constitution
of SFRY is concerned, its first Basic Principle said that the nations of
Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination,
including the right of secession... but no mechanism for secession was
identified.
The second interpretation evolved in relation to the Committees
decision on the request about the right of the Serbs, living in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to self-determination on the ground of being
one of the constituent peoples of the SFRY. The Committee refers to
Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1986 and
claims that the right of self-determination refers to safeguarding human
rights, and especially of the right to identity, and applies to minorities
and ethnic groups. Therefore, the Serbian population outside Serbia is
regarded as a minority, whose rights should be protected by the state,
i.e. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively. Those rights were
to be regulated by the existing international normative framework and
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by the draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia, held in
November 1991. In fact, the Hague Conference tried to raise the question
of rendering territorial autonomy to the Serbs in Krajna (Croatia) and
the Albanians in Kosovo, but this suggestion did not came into effect,
as there were no leverages to influence Serbian and Croat leadership.24
Territorial Arrangements
The Committees decision on the Yugoslav case was motivated by the
Mali-Burkina Faso case of the International Court of 1986. The answer
is based on the perception that the principle of inviolability of existing
frontiers cannot be ignored, and this is in line with the defined uti
possidentis.25 The 1986 case stipulates that the pre-existing administrative
frontiers of the colonies are to be considered the frontiers of the new
independent states. Any readjustment of the frontiers was deemed as a
threat to stability and peace, violating the basic principle of territorial
integrity of states. The International Court had also taken into consideration
the conflict between the principle of self-determination and that of uti
possidetis juris, but concluded that:
24 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995)
25 ...the Chamber cannot disregard the principle of uti possidetis juris, the application
of which gives rise to this respect for intangibility of frontiers.... It is a principle of
general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence,
wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of
new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. The fact that the new
African States have respected the territorial status quo which existed when they obtained
independence must therefore be seen not as a mere practice but as the application in
Africa of a rule of general scope which is firmly established in matters of decolonization;
and the Chamber does not find it necessary to demonstrate this for the purposes of the
case.
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The essential requirement of stability in order to survive,
to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all
fields has induced African States to consent to the maintenance
of colonial boundaries or frontiers, and to take account of this
when interpreting the principle of self-determination of peoples.
If the principle of uti possidetis has kept its place among the most
important legal principles, this is by a deliberate choice on the
part of African States.
The Badinter Committee itself noted that:
Whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states concerned
agree otherwise.26
This may be grounded on the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which defined the Republics as states
(Article 3) and stipulated (in Article 5) that the Republics territories and
boundaries cannot be altered without their consent.
Demise of a State, Not Secessions
The very opinions of the Badinter Committee (Opinion No.1-2) b) claim
that in the case of SFRY, the case is not of secession of different republics,
but of the disintegration of the federation, i.e. it was explicitly stated
that SFRY is no longer existent. The Committee concluded that the federal
institutions were not functioning, including the Federal Presidency, the
Federal Council, the Council of the Republics and the Provinces, the
Federal Executive Council, the Constitutional Court or the Federal Army,
and that they no longer meet the criteria of participation and representatives
26 Opinions of the Arbitration Committee. Opinion No 2.
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inherent in a federal state.
International recognition of demise or establishment of a state,
as contingent on the defining what a state means  it is commonly
defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population
subject to an organized political authority; that such a state is
characterized by sovereignty. Apart from these basic criteria, the
admission of a new state into the international community is done by
the members of this community through their recognition of the new
subject. Judgement for recognition is usually conditioned on the
prerequisite that the new state will respect international law and other
obligations. In the case of SFRY, the EC set formal criteria to be met
by the applicant republics.
Nonetheless, the criteria, concerning internal affairs are related
to two issues: (1) control exercised of the government over a territory
and (2) legitimacy of the government in question in relation to the
population.
Speaking in terms of federal and unitary states, the EC Committee
assumed that the federation no longer functions and the newly emerged
states are unitary ones and the governments are the legitimate ones.
The actual situation was rather different. Ethnic politics on behalf
of residing ethnic groups contested the legitimacy of the states and the
governments, leaving basically three options. The first one was keeping
the federation intact, expressed by Serb minorities in other countries;
the second one being gaining territorial autonomy within the existing
republics; the third option was applying the principle for self-
determination to the fullest, e.g. secession of minority territories from
host countries.
The international community opted for another solution, which
was based on preserving the republics in their existing borders and
securing human rights through arrangements as stipulated in basic
international documents.
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Case One: Aggression
Germany, backed up Austria, which had the guiding role amongst the
Western States, decided on recognizing the sovereignty of Slovenia
and Croatia in the end of 1991 and urged the other members of the
EC to do so in mid  January 1992. Whatever the reasons for the
German and Austrian behavior were27, the basis of the EC foreign
policy up to that moment  inviolability of borders and observing
the sovereignty of SFRY had already changed  after the international
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the administrative borders of the
SFRY had become borders of states. Thus, the major Helsinki (and
international) principle appeared again to protect the borders of the
newly self-determined states. The grounds for legitimizing international
intervention in this case were aggression on behalf of the Yugoslav
army and Yugoslavia. A similar case was that of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The course of events changed the situation. With the international
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, non-recognition of FRY
(Serbia and Montenegro) as successor of SFRY, the Serbs in Croatia
and Bosnia became secessionists themselves, opposing the
internationally acknowledged governments of the two states.
This approach of the international community could be traced
in the UN Security Council Resolutions, dating from 1991-1992.
Resolution 713 (1991) addressed the government of Yugoslavia,
Resolution 721 (1991) and Resolution 740 (1992) refers to Yugoslav
parties. After the acceptance of the former Yugoslav republics as UN
member states, they already had all the rights of sovereign members
of the international community and the protection thereof, as stated
in Resolution 787 (1992) referring to the threat to the territorial
integrity of the state.
27 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution: 1995).
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Case Two: Insurgency and Separatism
Acknowledged as an independent state, equal and sovereign member of
the UN, with an internationally recognized government, Bosnia and
Herzegovina was protected by international norms as against aggression
by another state (FRY) as well as from internal insurgency on behalf
of the Bosnian Serbs (and to some extend by Croats). The same was
true for the new Croatian State, challenged by the federal army and after
that by the Krajina Serbs. UN Chapter VII principles were reinforced
by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, stating that no changes attained
by force would be acceptable.
This was definitely cases when self-determination of people, was
not in line with the intentions, and hence with the particular rules of
the international community. The Serbs, already defined as a minority
or warring party and not a constituent nation, could claim self-
determination, the international actors viewed them generally as criminals.
Nonetheless, Serb atrocities disesteemed their claims and prevented
acknowledging them the status of belligerent party, fighting for a just
cause and hence, providing some sort of international legitimacy for their
aspirations.
Case Three: Humanitarian Catastrophe
Serb faction in Bosnia was semi-legalized by including them in the
numerous negotiations for Bosnia and finally were granted an entity
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in any case were not regarded as
fighters for freedom. Their actions were condemned as crimes against
humanity and are dealt with by the UN International Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia.
But what nationalism studies paradigm regards as ethnic
nationalism and ethonationalism, in terms of international relations and
law is quite a different matter.
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The Kosova Liberation Army of the Albanians since the start of
the armed clashes with the Serbian armed forces enjoyed the status of
belligerent party, which fought for just cause and thus could be regarded
as an ally of the democratic West. Though it is doubtful to what extend
they are really democrats, but self-determination for their people was
requested and was obtained on the battlefield by NATO forces.
Although possible as a result of the crisis, the partition of Kosovo
was not commented officially nor it was set as an option for resolving
the crisis. The West would also not accept partition of the province
between Albanians and Serbia, because it would be a sign for yielding
to Milosevics pressure. But there is also the explanation of upholding
previous course of action, based on avoiding change of borders beyond
certain extend, moreover, changes achieved by force.
From a normative point of view Kosovo was the hardest case to
be dealt with in terms of international intervention, as it was a constituent
part of the Republic of Serbia. The Ramboullet Accords, proposed in
early 1998, were rejected by the Serb side not only it provided
possibilities for Kosovos secession, but also it infringed the sovereignty
of Serbia itself
The official UN position, expressed in Resolution 1244 provides for:
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as
a part of the international civil presence under which the people
of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of
the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions
for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
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Possible Developments
The Kosovo-Montenegrin Seesaw
The complexity of the Balkan case is that there are several different cases,
to which the principle of self-determination can be applicable, with its
own peculiarities.
Kosovo is undoubtedly the current issue number one in the long
list of Balkan troubles. Being part of Yugoslavia, the options for its status
are: full independence, autonomy within Serbia, constituent republic
within FRY. Currently, it is an international protectorate, governed by
UN administration. The document that arranges its status internationally
is the UN Resolution 1244, and the Military Technical Agreement
between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.
The experience of the Balkans indicates that the international
community will not be inclined to grant the right to secession self-
determination to any entity in the former Yugoslav, at least nominally.
Kosovo has been provided with an opportunity for self-government and
autonomy but no one has declared the right to secede from FRY or Serbia.
Neither the Serbs from Kosovo will be allowed secession, the approach
being some sort of conscosiational arrangement.
The second republic that constitutes the FR Yugoslavia is
Montenegro. According to the constitution of FRY, it is a sovereign
federal state, founded on the equality of citizens and the equality of its
member republics. The territory of FRY is a single entity comprised by
the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, its frontiers are inviolable and
represents an economic area with a single market.28
28 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 1992) stipulates in Section
I, Basic Provisions, Article 1: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a sovereign
federal state, founded on the equality of citizens and the equality of its member republics.
Article 2: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be composed of the Republic of
Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may be joined
by other member republics, in accordance with the present Constitution. And Article
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The independent policy led by President Djukanovic, threaten
the very existence of FR Yugoslavia. For months the Montenegrin
authorities has adopted measures that would provide for political,
economic and financial, military emancipation of the state. Those
policies, combined with the demonstrated ties with the West and the
support for the Serbian opposition, risk open confrontation with
Milosevic. Besides this menace, there are at least several other
impediments to Montenegrin independence. The republic faces first
internal conflict between supporters and opponents of rift with Serbia,
and consequently it risks itself break-up between the Northern and the
Southern part of the country. What concerns the international environment,
the West is not inclined to support independence now as it prefers to
have an ally within FRY and vests its hopes on Djukanovic as unifier
of the Serbian opposition, and Russian geopolitical purposes will not
allow independence either.
In the regional system Kosovo and Montenegro are in a specific
kind of correlation. They both held the key of the future of FRY and
hence to the regional security situation.  The interconnectedness of
Kosovo and Montenegro is twofold. One of the options for arranging
the status of Kosovo is to establish the territory as a third, constituent
republic in the federation. If Montenegro secedes from the union with
Serbia, this will be the end of FRY and a federation between Serbia
and Kosovo is virtually impossible.
Moreover, as a legal issue, it is a matter of the current constitution
of FRY, where the Federal Assembly has to decide on the alteration of
3: The territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a single entity comprising
the territories of the member republics. The frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
shall be inviolable. The boundaries between member republics may be changed only subject
to their agreement, in accordance with the constitutions of the member republics. Article
7: Within its competencies, a member republic may maintain relations with foreign states,
establish its own missions in other states, and join international organizations. Within
its competencies, a member republic may conclude international agreements, but not to
the detriment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or any of its other member republics.
; Article 13: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall constitute a single economic area
having a single market.
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frontiers and the inclusion of other republics29  it is doubtful whether
the current Assembly would agree on such arrangements.
On the other hand, international recognition of Kosovos
independence is going to further destabilize Serbia and exacerbate the
rift within the existing federation.
The Bosnian Puzzle
The external borders of BiH had remained unchanged since it was
recognized as an independent state in 1992, but the internal structure
was constituted with the Dayton peace treaty o 1995. It is confederate
structure with complex relations between the two entities and between
different levels of government.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an international quasi-protectorate,
which status is legitimized by the Dayton Peace Accords.30 The state
consists of two entities  the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republika Srpska, but in fact the three ethnic groups (or
constituent nations) has kept the ethnic divisions intact in the institutional
make-up of the state.31 In this regard, the state is like a puzzle, which
29 Section V: Organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1. Article 78: The Federal Assembly shall: ... 2) decide on admission of other states as
member republics into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; decide on association with
other states and on membership in international organizations;   3) decide on alterations
to the frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; decide on war and peace; declare
a state of war, a state of imminent threat of war, and state of emergency.
30 1. Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which
shall henceforth be Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall continue its legal existence under
international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and
with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member State of
the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply for membership
in organizations within the United Nations system and other international organizations.
3. Composition. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter the Entities).
31 [T]oday Bosnia and Herzegovina has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate
armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper
and operates at the mercy of the entities. ...political power is concentrated largely in the
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is put in order by the international community and could be easily set
apart, contested by the different ethnic groups.
If a process of frontier rearrangements occurs, Republika Srpska
would be the first to break up and join Serbia, followed by the Croatian
entities in the Federation of BiH.
Sandzak and Vojvodina
The region of Sandzak has been a concern for policy analysts, deemed
as a potential spot of conflict. It is inhabited mostly by Muslim
population, which has special historical and ethnic affiliation with the
Bosniaks, and is often regarded and regards themselves Bosniaks. The
political parties of the Sandzak Muslims are branches of the Bosnian
Muslims parties, like the Party of Democratic Action. During the war
in Bosnia and the Kosovo campaign they have suffered limitations of
their rights and have raised a voice for autonomy and self-rule to the
federal government and the governments of Serbia and Montenegro.
The region encompasses a territory, distributed almost evenly
between Serbia and Montenegro, thus holding the pass between the two
Yugoslav republics. The importance of this territory to Serbia and
Montenegro would be the first obstacle to dealing with potential conflict,
because neither Serbia nor Montenegro would agree upon partition of
vital parts of their states. The second impediment is that in the light
of recent experience, the international community does not have a solid
ground for supporting self-determination/secession of a territory which
did not enjoy previously a sort of autonomy.
hands of hard line nationalists determined to obstruct international efforts to advance
the peace process. The effect has been to cement wartime ethnic cleansing and maintain
ethnic cleansers in power within mono-ethnic political frameworks. The few successes
of Dayton-the Central Bank, a common currency, common license plates, state symbols
and customs reforms-are superficial and were imposed by the international community.
Indeed, the only unqualified success has been the four-year absence of armed
conflict....Ominously, in the past, many local politicians have channelled this unrest into
nationalism.
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Vojvodina is a different case, although it is largely populated by
non-Serb population, the Hungarians being the most populous minority.
The conflict factors have not combined in such a manner so to lead to
violent clashes. Given the previous autonomous status of the Serbian
province, comparable to that of Kosovo, it is likely that future aspirations
of the minorities there will be directed to achieving certain benefits from
the central authorities. As the conflict is there, but has not reached yet
the point of no return, there is still time to introduce non-violent conflict
management strategies, embodied on institutional solutions different from
secession or partition.
Macedonia
Macedonia is contingent on the delicate balance in present Yugoslavia.
The deterrence of Kosovo Albanians secession aspiration will provide
time for the country to manage its own interethnic tensions between the
Albanian minority and the Macedonian majority. The current leadership
of the country includes one of the Albanian parties, but it is almost sure
that more concessions, in terms of representation and participation in
governance, will be required by the local Albanian community. Macedonia
should be more adequately supported by the West, and its territorial
integrity should be explicitly guaranteed.
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Institutional Dimension of Imposing Solutions
Weak States, Democracy and Self-determination
Self-determination, as a normative idea, is deemed as a predecessor and
a counterpart of the democratization wave in global perspective. But in
fact, self-determination in the international normative framework hardly
prescribes the establishment of Western type of democracy, rather it
reiterates the right of peoples to freely determine whatever political
system they would introduce.
In the Balkans, the West-lead international community, acting
through its institutions, has been persistent to fill in this gap. It
endeavored to impose democratization in self-determining territories,
starting from the EC Conference from 1991 to Dayton and Kosovo to
the Stability Pact of 1999. Although, strictly speaking, this is in
contradiction with the UN documents, the conflict resolution strategies
in the backyard of the Euro-Atlantic space are bound to include
democracy values.
Democratization could be also a viable conflict solution, as it can
more easily accommodate institutional forms of ethnic conflict management,
different from secession as the farthest measure to be undertaken.
Any solution for preventing or managing conflict is to be
implemented by some authority. In the international system, the primary
subjects are states, which bear the responsibility to carry out international
obligations. In the Balkans, ethnic conflicts are as a rule a conflict
between a minority and the host-state, though not always the case. An
important consideration should be the case when the state cannot perform,
it is a weak state.
A related term is soft-state with weak or eroded (missing) civic
identity, which cannot meet the requirement of granting state power
through true popular vote.  In short, this is the strength of a state, its
ability to impose regulations, to monitor their implementation and if
necessary to enforce them. This has been identified as a global security
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threat for the 21st century.32 In case of considerable weakness of the state
or even lack of state and its institutions, the international community has
resorted not only to peacekeeping, but also to overall administering of
states and territories. They have engaged themselves in fact in state-
building efforts, trying to establish at least a minimum of state infrastructure.
State-building efforts on behalf of the international community are
narrowed down not to establishing any sort of self-government, but to
democratic regimes. The democratization strategy seems somewhat
taken for granted, after ten years of post-communist transitions to liberal
democracy, when there is hardly anyone in former communist countries
who upholds the opposite stand. Nationalists of diverse caliber are no
exception.
In order to deter conflict resurgence the international community
has resorted not only to peace-keeping but also to the establishment of
dependent states and territories, with international administrations with
the task to build-up local transition authorities as a first step. Subsequently,
the steps are to include the granting the right to exercise in full self-
determination to these entities, be it in the form of independence or
some sort autonomy and selfgovernance.
Protectorates and Trust Territories
Imposing international administrations bears a resemblance in the Mandate
system of the League of Nations and the Trusteeship system of the United
Nations. After World War I the League transferred the colonies of the
defeated empires to be ruled by victor states. After World War II, the
Mandate territories were handled by a specially designed organ of the
UN  the Trusteeship Council  under the special provisions of the
UN Chapter.
32 See Gwyn Prins. Security challenges for the 21st century. NATO Review: WEBEDITION,
No. 1 - Jan. 1997, Vol. 45 - pp. 27-30; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/
articles/9701-8.htm; Internet; accessed on March 7, 2000.
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Article 76 of the Charter outlined the objectives of the system,
saying that it would further international peace and security and promote
the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development
towards self-government or independence. This system had been established
to put an end to the colonial system, and just recently finished its
activities.
Out of three current UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans,
two has the task to actually govern their territories.33 The case of BiH
is not so clear, because there it is recognized independent state, member
of the United Nations. Although there are formally acting Constitution
and government institutions, the actual decision-making is vested to the
UN High Representative for Civil Affairs who is the supreme arbiter.
The Dayton Peace Treaty, Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation
of the Peace Settlement, Article V Final Authority to Interpret: The High
Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation
of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.
Even more broad is the UNMIKs (United Nations Interim Administration
in Kosovo) mandate, introduced by the UN Resolution 1244 and the
subsequent documents.34
The comparison to the trusteeship system and protectorates bears
negative connotations, and is not fitting into the UN regulations. Though,
observers describing the actual situation commonly refer it to. It is a
necessary stage in building security in the troubled Balkans.
The regional implications are that this state of affairs has in fact
introduced a protectorate system in the Balkans, which is dependent
on ongoing international delivery of humanitarian aid, financial resources,
security, etc. There are two considerations, ensuing from the present
33 The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) monitors the
demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighbouring areas in Croatia and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
34 UNMIK/reg/1999/1; 25 July 1999; Regulation no. 1999/1. On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo.
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system. The first one is that Bosnia and Kosovo are interrelated, as in
terms of the prestige of the international community, i.e. it has to prove
its capacity to achieve its goals, because failure of one of the missions
will have repercussions in the situation of the other. The second
consideration is that the behavior of protectorate system affects and will
affect the broader regional system. The present status of BiH and Kosovo
has been determined by the international community, but external
dependence is restricted in time so they will have to self-determine
themselves sooner or later.
Security Implications
International post-World War II order has been mastered through the
normative regulations of the UN charter, especially the principle of
territorial sovereignty, enshrined in Chapter II, Article 4, stating that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Challenges to this principle are regarded as threats to international
peace and are also codified in basic documents of regional organizations
such as the Helsinki Principles of the OSCE. The global changes
occurring in the international system are limiting more and more state
sovereignty. International intervention, as stipulated in UN Chapter VII,
is grounded on human rights violations concerns, related to the right
to self-determination.
Self-determination could be called upon when renegotiating the
status of the underrepresented or oppressed group, be it an ethnic group,
nation or a population of a territory. This principle, albeit just in its
essence, proves to be a serious challenge to international order and peace.
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The international community has been challenged several times
by recurring Balkan crises in terms of balancing between these and related
norms through solutions that accommodate more or less the claims of
all parties involved and at the same time avoiding major disturbances
in the international order.
There are several dimensions of the impact of the right to self-
determination, posing threats to security.35 They are:
1. Spill-over of the conflict or domino effect.
2. Balkanization, i.e. fragmentation of states into small, hostile units.
3. Trapped minorities within newly established entities (e.g. the
current situation of Serbs in Kosovo).
4. The danger to a democratic process, challenged by undemocratic
minorities, aiming disintegration of the given host-state.
5. The establishment of too small, non-viable entities, which would
require constant international aid.
6. Recent experience from Kosovo has posed another grave, soft-
security threat  the fear of establishing de facto of a criminal
state, which cannot provide control but rather generates criminality.
The measures undertaken by the international community for
managing these problems are diverse, and as the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe indents, all-embracing and integrated set of
strategies. However, there are four pillars of the conflict management
strategy so far: delimiting fragmentation to previously existing
35 See also Alexis Heraclides, The International Normative Framework, The Self-
determination of Minorities in International Politics. (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 28.
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administrative units, requiring strict human rights regulations, imposing
order by establishing international protectorates or semi-protectorates.
The last pillar, rather a desire, is the basis of all long-term
strategies of the West to sustain solutions for the Balkans. This is
democratization, with a special focus on Serbia. The premise is that
a democratic Serbia, and any democratic society would match
perfectly their goals.
The problem of this approach is that democratization of
Serbia is understood as Serbia without Milosevic. No one
amongst the champions of democracy  the Serbian opposition
leaders, the Montenegrin government, the former KLA leaders 
has really proved that is adherent of functioning, Western type of
democracy. The best that has been achieved or would be achieved
is introduction of democratic institutions and political process, but
that will be unlikely to go beyond formal procedures, like holding
elections and the like.
Democratization as a grand strategy is sound enough, at least
in the long run, but in the short and medium term policy actions
should be congruent with the objective of avoiding the above
mentioned security threats.
n Limiting (or delaying the claims to) the right for self-
determination to self-rule, not to secession and  independence, thus
n Avoiding inducement of similar claims among various minorities,
entities, etc. and thus
n Preventing further fragmentation, and change of borders
n Requiring, throughout the region, and imposing, in the current
international protectorates, rule of law and the infrastructure of a strong
state.
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An important element of conflict management strategies in this
case is timing. The international actors should indicate clearly their long-
term involvement and objectives. It will take several decades for
international (NATO) military presence and administration to deter and
build a long lasting peace in the region. The UN/NATO forces in Bosnia
have been on the ground for five years already with no significant
achievements that would guarantee that the state would not fall apart
after their withdrawal.
Before providing the right to self-determination, the international
community has first to make sure that there is an adequate institutional
level (infrastructure of a state) attained in a given unit, claiming such
a right. Otherwise, the international actors will face an ongoing process
of evolvement of smaller and smaller political units (Balkanization
proper), inimical to each other and uncontrollable by international norms.
The lack of resources to manage these units has only one alternative
 to work with political units, which has the capacity to carry out
adequate policy decisions.
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Growing mass criminalization of Albanian communities in Albania,
Kosovo and Macedonia poses a direct threat to regional security and
sets serious obstacles to regional reconstruction efforts. Albanian mafia
groups, organized in typical  Albanian social and cultural structures
gain more and more power from operating freely in three different
countries, taking advantage of the weak states of Albania and Macedonia
and the inability of the international transitional administration of
Kosovo to enforce law and order. The observed mass criminalization of
Albanian communities and the expansion of organized crime through
developing powerful regional networks currently hinders the process of
reconstruction and development of Southeastern Europe and will complicate
the future enlargement of the European Union towards this end of Europe.
Decreasing wide spread criminalization in the Balkans should
become a main objective in implementing reconstruction and
development policies for the region. There have been considerations
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALBANIAN
COMMUNITIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
Georgi Tsekov
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for tapping this negative phenomenon, mainly along the lines of the
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which have not yet produced
expected results.
Social Reorganization of Albanian Communities
Migration and Urbanization
For the past ten years, Albanians have followed a pattern of mass
migration to cities looking for better economic opportunities. The crises
in Kosovo and blood feuds between clans in Albania reinforced the
process by destroying rural settlements and providing new means for
survival, mainly humanitarian aid and involvement in intensive trafficking
of drugs, arms and people36. Demographic changes in areas populated
by Albanians and the recent international intervention in Kosovo have
made it impossible to keep track of the redistribution of Albanians in
Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. Most of the movements have been
towards small towns, thus leading to ruralization of town rather than
urbanization of villages. The main reason for this process is determined
by the fact that excessive accumulation of population in cities has raised
social and psychological issues of shock adaptation. Combined with
quests for alternative means for survival, this process have resulted in
criminalization of large groups of Albanians in Albania, Kosovo and
Macedonia.
The absence of powerful state institutions capable of maintaining
legal order and applying sanctions led to establishing of Albanian mafia
36 Aim Press correspondent in Pristina Fehim Rexhepi noted in an article dated July
20,1999, that one of the strongest motives for migration of the rural Albanian population
to towns is the scarcity of foreign aid in villages. Fehim Rexhepi, Challenge for KFOR,
AIM Pristina July 20,1999; available from http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/
199907/90723-002-trae-pri.htm; Internet; accessed March 5, 2000.
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groups, which provide well paying jobs for an increasing number of
Albanians37.
Crises of Statehood and Power Vacuum
Transition processes and the weakness of state institutions, which
followed long authoritarian rule, revived Albanian social organization
models of extended families and clans and medieval power patterns. Well-
organized gangs, mainly from North Albania took advantage of the
weakened Yugoslav grasp on Kosovo and in recent years successfully
filled the power vacuum.
In neighboring North Western Macedonia, the government has
failed to enforce laws and legal order or conduct administrative activities,
leaving room for power consolidation of ethnic Albanian political parties.
Local reports say that in order to find jobs ethnic Albanians must hold
membership in the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)38. This party
is considered to have the power of decision-making and holding quasi-
administrative functions in this part of Macedonia and being the only
entity in control of Macedonias state borders with Albania and Kosovo.
One of the major outcomes of the international intervention in
Kosovo  the lack of government control over state borders, has facilitated
the spread of Albanian gangs and well-coordinated activity on the territories
of three different countries. Albanian leaders also take advantage of the
absence of the state and its functions in all the aforementioned territories
and act as a substitute  they organize order, enforce customs and rules,
organize sanctions and fines, and guide both economic and political events.
37 The actual situation in Kosovo in 1999 in terms of order and legality has worstened
after the withdrawal of Serbian authorities, providing room for unsanctioned functioning
of mafia groups. Kosovo has been in a similar state even before this year due to the
inability of Belgrade to tighten control over the province. See: Julius Strauss, The Telegraph
(UK), September 5, 1999.
38 Kim Mehmeti, Pyramidal System of Value AIM Skopje, 17 April, 1997. Available
from http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199704/70423-006-trae-sko.htm; Internet;
accessed on March 5, 2000.
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Revival of the Clan System
Albanian mafia is recognized as one of the most powerful drug and arms
mafias worldwide, primarily due to its clan-like organization, loyal and
well integrated members. Reports show that such groups have reproduced
ancient moral codes and ethics (kanun) which ensure the unity of the
group and provide for sticking to the group interest. A typical act of
enforcing the kanun is the blood vendetta, serving as a punishment for
offending the dignity of a clan member or undermining the authority of
a leader. A potential target could be any member of the clan whose
representative did the offense39. The integrity of the clan organization
of Albanian communities is based upon a specific set of values and
expanding networks of family members and relatives. The traditional
cultural inability to separate rational from emotional choices, combined
with a number of inbred believes, have made it impossible for a large
number of Albanians to make the distinction between crime and
patriotism. In many occasions, such sentiments are abused by chiefs of
organized crime groups for effective maintenance of the unity of the group
and secure incorporation of new members. As a result of this internal
integrity, Albanian mafia has taken a leading position on the international
arena in recent years.
39 The 15th century kanun (code) of Lek Dukagjini, Lord of Dagmo and Zadrima regulates
revenge killings to preserve the honor of the clan. His intention was to limit the cycles
of bloodletting among the mountain tribps which sometimes destroyed entire communities
by enabling a council of tribal elders to arrange a besa, or truce once honour had been
obtained. or fis has been revived in northern Albania since the demise of communism.
Enver Hoxhas regime suppressed the kanun but the privatisation of land, which reopened
ancient disputes, and the breakdown of law and order last year, when Albanias armouries
were looted, have encouraged direct retribution. The code doesnt allow women to be
killed, but there have been cases in Tropoje [on the Kosovo border], where women have
been forced into hiding by death threats. See Owen Bowcott, Thousands of Albanian
children in hiding to escape blood feuds, The Guardian, September, 30 1998.
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Albanian Organized Crime
The Balkan Route
The increasing criminalization of Albanians has reinforced the Albanian
gangs key position on the Balkan Route of heroin. The Balkan Route, being
a major channel of drug trafficking to Western Europe, has developed into
a whole infrastructure corridor. Along the corridor, there are a number of
dispatcher points, local organized groups, transportation and drug processing
facilities. Official reports recently confirm that Albanians have pushed away
Turkish gangs in trafficking heroin form the Middle East to Western Europe40.
They have consolidated their stand in the business by linking directly to
Georgian and Armenian drug mafia, which generate almost all of the traffic
of drugs from Asia to Western Europe. Having Albanians as an option,
Armenians and Georgians have ceased their partnership with Turkish gangs,
due to historic and cultural feuds.
Transborder Expansion
The inclusion of more and more Albanians in organized crime is also
a result of the expansion of Albanian gangs on the free-of-law territories
of Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania. The internal growth of
Albanian mafia groups and recent events in Kossovo contributed to a
different redistribution of illegal earnings. In the eve of the Kossovo
crises, drugs were usually traded for arms, Albanians abroad organized
serious fundraising activities in Western Europe, US and Australia, and
some sympathetic governments financially supported the Kosovo liberation
movement41. UN experts predicted that in 2000 drug crops in Afghanistan
40 1999 Report of the Interpol and the 1999 annual report of the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB).
41 Fund-raising efforts of Kosovars in the United States, as well as those of Albania
immigrants in Europe, have increased steadily over the past few yesrs. According to
diplomatic and other observers with experience in the region, the money thus assembled
has helped the rebels get arms and smuggle them into Kosovo over routes through Albania,
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will be twice higher than 1999, which may lead to mobilization of
additional resources for trafficking to Western Europe. That may cause
additional criminalization among Albanians, who are the main players
on the Balkan Route42.
International Contributions to Criminalization
Inability to Enforce Rule of Law
Besides the internal factors stimulating the phenomenon of mass
criminalization of Albanians, there are certain external factors leading
to the same results. Most of these come from the international intervention
in the Kosovo crises of 1999 and the proliferation of semi-protectorates
in the Albanian populated areas.
Contrary to the initial expectations and goals of the intervention,
the international institutions have failed so far to overcome the chaos
in Kosovo. The underlying well-organized and efficient criminal
structures will hamper any outside attempt at restoring order and law.
The existence of criminalized clan groups will most definitely confront
the establishment of functioning democratic institutions and viable
economic policies.
The international administration of Kosovo has been based
upon the cooperation between three entities    the United Nations
Macedonia and Montenegro. Supporters of the Kosovo rebels have set up a fund, Home
Land Calling, which has a bank account at Peoples Bank in Bridgeport, Conn. KLA
supporters in Europe have set up Home Land Calling accounts in Sweden, Italy, Belgium
and Canada. The bank names and account numbers are advertised in Albanian newspapers
printed in Europe. See: Stacy Sullivan, Albanian Americans Funding Rebels Cause The
Washington Post, Tuesday, May 26, 1998;
42 The National Agency for Fighting Organized Crime (NAFOC) reported in February,
2000 that illegal drug traffic has undergone a sharp increase over the past couple of months.
NAFOC chief Gen Kiril Radev said Bulgaria has confiscated 104 kg of heroin - the
amount of all confiscated heroin for 1999, only in two months in 2000. See press - http:/
/www.mvr.bg.
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(UN) through the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK);
KFOR (Including NATO and Russian troops) and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)43. UNMIKs mission
is to launch transitional administration and normalize political and
economic process, KFOR is in charge of preventing armed conflict
and guaranteeing general security and OSCE is in charge of
organizing elections, supporting independent media and durable
democratic system.
UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE on many occasions have failed to
act in cooperation and coordination among themselves, not to
mention local entities. The international efforts in Kosovo have
failed to restore order and apply simple rules for operation. Some
of the most pressing issues, like issuing of ID documents, which
are rare among Albanians will be difficult to solve, since the
authorized government to do that is in Belgrade. The absence of
laws, court system, police force and normal political and economic
development supports the further expansion of Albanian organized
crime and encourages similar developments in Macedonia. Gangs in
fact act under the umbrella of the international administration and
take advantage of the chaos44.
Foreign Aid
International humanitarian aid, which among other things have been a
driving motive for migration of Albanians, is reportedly used as a
supplement to immigrant remittances and criminal earnings, amounting
to income which is more attractive than wages from usual economic
activities45. Since there is no clear information about the number of
43 In accordance with RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) adopted by the UN Security Council
at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999(see annex 2)
44 See: Fehim Rexhepi (AIM Pristina), Challenge for KFOR, 20 July 1999.
45 Here is a very interesting account by an Albanian journalist on the issue: Paradoxically
Albania still has the strongest currency in all Eastern Europe. Albanian currency lek
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Albanians in different areas, there are doubts that aid is also misappropriated
and traded at black markets. It seems that humanitarian aid paradoxically
is turning into one of the obstacles to normalization of economic
activities. There is a similar situation in Western Macedonia where a great
number of people still live primarily on humanitarian aid.
International institutions have just started to acknowledge that aid
money could have a demoralizing effect on local level and directly
stimulate organized crime46. There are many conditions for the positive
effect of foreign aid to be easily undermined by corruption and
ineffectiveness of the domestic institutions and criminalized public
administration, a direct consequence of malfunctioning states and
disintegrating societies47.
is almost stable and the inflation in levels close to zero, not much due to the applied
economic policy, than the fact that the country gets $1 million per day from the immigrants
remittances, of nearly 500,000 immigrants who work in Greece and Italy and also
considerable amount of hard currency circulate in the country due to the illegal traffics
of drugs, prostitutes, stolen cars etc. Remzi Lani (AIM-Tirana) Albania - Nine Years After.
46 The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: From Expectations to Shortcomings, IRIS,
2000.
47 Around the Regional Donors Conference of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,
held in late March, 2000 in Brussels, some EU officials admitted about the demoralizing
effect of foreign aid in some cases  when it fuels corruption and stimulates organized
crime.
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Balkan Reconstruction
and Decriminalization
Programs and policies of the international community for reconstruction
and development of the Balkan region should consider a number of
measures for decriminalization of Albanian communities and preventing
the spread of the phenomena. The international community has offered
a plan of measures in this respect, as part of the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe and several policy recommendations developed
by the Center for European Policy Studies.
Stability Pact Provisions
Following the Regional Funding Conference in Brussels in late
March, it became clear that the initial expectations for balanced
financial approach within the three working tables did not happen.
Besides the scarcity of the funds, hardly even reaching levels of
EUR 2 billion, the donor conference allocated most of the funds
to the Second Table along infrastructure projects.
At the same time, not enough funds were allocated to empower
procedures and mechanisms for meeting the goal of the First and
the Third Tables, within whose priorities are fighting corruption and
criminalization and generally sustaining regional security. All the
funds that were allocated for Stability Pact projects, given the current
institutional framework and capabilities of states in the region, will
be utilized and appropriated at very low levels.
The successful implementation of the Stability Pact requires
coordinated efforts to help local societies refashion states and re-invent
democracies. In order to be effective, international contributions should
be supported by a favorable institutional environment. From an
institutional point of view, SEE states represent weak countries. Their
weakness is considered to constitute the major cause of regional
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insecurity and lack of stability48. In order to avoid the long-term
projection of this negative factor reconstruction efforts should be
focused on several issues which hold a strategic importance for the
region in short and medium terms.
Alongside Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact special attention
and direct support should be paid to several components  governance,
local democracy and education. Supporting sound and good governance
is one of the primary objectives in the process of decriminalization. In
the Balkans, states maintain inefficient institutions, unable or unwilling
to enforce the rule of law or to implement consistent policies. Levels
of tax collection are low and institutions are unable to deliver public
goods and services. Some states are weaker than others, but in all cases
it is clear that the state has failed to offer security and development.
The proliferation of para-military groups and high levels of crime and
corruption are among the usual results of the dysfunction of public
institutions. Stability Pact task forces on good governance though should
not be focused on establishing respect for human rights49 but emphasis
should be put on rationalizing public administration, promoting transparency
and accountability of public institutions. Successful efforts in this respect
will restrict the mass character of criminalization and will provide
necessary conditions for fighting the phenomenon. Supporting local
democracy and education reform initiatives will in to a certain extend
complimentary to the efforts for establishing good governance.
The Working Table on Security is essential for the development
of effective decriminalization measures. Adopting a set of legal instruments
for fighting organized crime and corruption is of utmost importance,
48 Latest reports on the situation in SEE underline the fact that the increased level of
insecurity in the region is best explained and confronted in terms of the weak state
 see Human Security in Southeast Europe - Special report commissioned by UNDP.
49 Report on the achievements of the Stability Pact - Working Table on Democratization
and Human Rights, IRIS Papers, April, 2000.
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especially for the Western Balkans50. The Pact should support a proactive
strategy for regional efforts and initiatives in fighting organized crime,
since the phenomenon is regional than country specific. Enhancing the
quality and efficiency of the police and judicial systems in the Western
Balkans is only possible after implementing entire packages of strategic
measures for state building and consolidation.
Customs Union
Corruption and criminalization  widespread phenomena in SEE countries
 have grown to become major means of conducting politics and doing
business. In addition to the traditional distorted distribution of internal
resources and the draining of national economies, a relatively new
approach to misusing international goods and cash flow generated by
international trade has gained ground. Often, customs revenues are used
as a source of financing not only for organized crime groups but also
political parties and elites.
The suggestion for a customs union in the Balkans51 and abolishing
tariffs in order to reduce organized crime will inevitably decrease on
the other hand the countries fresh cash revenues. CEPS suggests that
the EU should cover the loss of trade tariffs (only in trade with the EU)
since the accession policies envisions abolition of such tariffs in the future
for Balkan countries which will join the Union. In the short term, a
customs union will seriously destabilize the weak states even more, and
on the other hand organized crime groups might easily try to compensate
the loss of such revenue through equally illegal means, like burglary,
for instance.
50 The sub-table on Justice and Home Affairs within the Third Working Table of the
Stability Pact has suggested to accede to the Council of Europes legal instruments, mainly
the Convention on Laundering, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime and
the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption. IRIS Papers - Reports on the
Achievements of the Stability Pact, April, 2000.
51 Gros, Daniel, An Economic System for Post War South Eastern Europe, CEPS Paper,
June 25, 1999.
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Concluding Remarks
Organized crime and corruption, involving broad sections of the
population support the growing wave of criminalization. The viability
of this process is caused not so much by assumptions for state or
official support and sponsoring but it is rather a result of social and
cultural phenomena. Recently a process of great concern is the
affiliation of organized crime with political structures    typical
for the entire area of the Balkans. Recently local opposition media
in Macedonia alleged DPA and it leader Arben Xhafferi to be in charge
of 70% of the orgaized crime52. There is a clear tendency of
participation of governments in the trafficking through the national
territory, used as a main source of financing.
It is not very likely that any regional reconstruction initiative
will succeed in the context of growing criminalization and the steady
political regime in Belgrade. Recommendation on behalf of the
international community for united efforts of Balkans states to stop
criminalization will not give expected results. So far, the international
community has failed in its intentions to bring stability and security
and the individual countries in the region do not have the resources
to initiate effective regional cooperation. On the other hand, organized
crime groups operate in perfect regional syndicates, despite of ethnic,
religious or cultural differences.
Criminalization, seen as one of the main obstacles for regional
reconstruction and development, is targeted by a package of provisions
within the Stability Pact, as well as by other entities. All the measures
and strategies though are rather piecemeal, and have received no
serious financial support from the donor countries and organizations.
Another problem in this respect is the lack of overall vision about
possible ways of reducing criminalizations. The relatively stable
52 Dnevnik Daily in Internet; available from dnevnik.com.mk/archives; Internet; accessed
March, 12 2000.
79
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Spring 2000
countries in the region form the so called cordone sanitaire around
Former Yugoslavia are in an extremely vulnerable situation, serving
as a buffer zone. Instead of influencing positive developments, these
countries face a future of bad economic conditions and low standards
of living  which can only reinforce negative events and expand
criminalization, political and social stagnation beyond the Albanian-
populated areas.
